AUMF: Hillary's vote to authorize the use of military force against Iraq is, at one of the deepest levels, part and parcel of Hillary Clinton's downfall. Not because Hillary voted to authorize force -- no, many other good Democrats also made that mistake -- but because Hillary obstinately refused to admit that the vote was ever an error.
Instead, AUMF shaped Hillary's Senate career. Never let them hear you were wrong. Never admit error. Clinton's AUMF also demonstrated to Democratic activists that Clinton might not be one to be trusted in matters of national security, an area that Clinton believes is her strong suit.
While it cannot be said that Hillary's AUMF vote directly lead to her defeat against Barack Obama, the vote, and Hillary's eternal defense of that vote, did shape her personality throughout her campaign -- Avoid taking responsibility for anything anytime.
Mark Penn: No factor in Hillary's run for the White House was more crucial than her selection of Mark Penn as her primary strategist. A man shaped by 1990's political thought, Mark Penn did things the 1990s way. Especially fund-raising.
While Clinton may have used the internet to announce her campaign, she abruptly seemed to ignore the internet, especially for fund-raising, opting instead for 1990s bundler-style fund-raising. It worked. But bundler-style fund-raising is limited in the number of donors and in the amount of donation per person.
It was really not until after Texas-Ohio that Clinton caught on to internet fund-raising. The primary season, however, at least for Hillary Clinton, ended in the month of February. Internet funding was, by then, too little, too late. Furthermore, failing to embrace internet funding early on was also symptomatic of Clinton's failure to recruit and manage her grassroots supporters.
Clinton really should have had an idea that perhaps Penn wasn't "the guy" when, in the Spring of 2007, Penn mistakenly thought that many of the upcoming Democratic primaries were "winner-take-all". Instead Clinton campaigned for many months on the theory that her name and long-term political presence alone was sufficient to prevail in the pesky Democratic primary season.
In short, Penn never really knew what he was doing or what he was talking about in the 2008 Presidential nominating cycle, time having past him by.
Kyl-Lieberman: In the summer of 2007, Democratic activists were largely in the Obama-Edwards camps, with many, such as myself, holding out for an October surprise -- an Al Gore announcement. But most activists are also realists, and reality dictated that activists might have to get behind the Clinton juggernaut eventually. The woman simply looked unstoppable in the summer of 2007.
Beyond the apparent inevitability, however, a strange thing was in the minds of many activists: Clinton, from her summer and early fall debate performances, might actually be "okay." She was charming. She was witty. She was funny. In one debate, Clinton was asked a difficult question about Bill, and she just laughed sweetly and said she'd have to ask Bill about that later. The comment won her the debate in my mind.
Then came Kyl-Lieberman. Never on solid ground with the activists because of AUMF, Kyl-Lieberman was the last straw. Kyl-Lieberman was, and remains, a Congressional green light for George W. Bush to wage war against Iran. An Iran war could mean the end of civilization as we know it, due to potential destruction of Middle East oilfields.
Thus ended the Democratic activistist flirtation with rapprochement with Hillary Clinton (with the exception of the feminist camp).
October 31, 2007, Debate: The immigrant driver's license flap was critical. Not for activists. But for the general public.
In a mere two minutes of poor debate, Hillary Clinton demonstrated to the greater public a moment of confusion, compounded by the famous Clinton flaw of refusing to admit to an error.
The aura of inevitability was cracked, and, like Humpty-Dumpty, could never be put together again.
It won't be a long run: It was late December. Clinton stated in an interview with Stepanopolous that she was "in it for the long run", and that "it wasn't a very long run -- it would be over by February 5."
In one 30 second sound bite, Clinton demonstrated the hubris that characterized her entire campaign: Over-confidence and lack of planning.
Mark Penn's flawed strategy was never more apparent.
Time to go Negative: After losing Iowa, Clinton laughingly announced that she would go negative, and "now comes the fun part."
In the Democratic primaries, negative campaigning is typically much less effective than in a general election. Democratic primary voters, by and large, tend to be higher information voters, and thus, are incrementally better equipped to resist negative campaigning.
While the "kitchen sink" strategy may have worked intermittently for Clinton during the campaign, in the end, Clinton lost her way. And it caused her put her foot in her mouth on more than one occasion. See Sniper Fire below. Also instructive is Clinton's "Commander-in-Chief" endorsement of herself and John McCain (still a stick in the craw of many Democrats).
A great irony is that Clinton supporters are now so disillusioned about the "negativity" they perceive was heaped upon Hillary Clinton, failing to remember who it was that declared the all-out war of negativity (and then with a smile and a gleam in her eye).
John Edwards: After his loss in South Carolina, John Edwards had to make a painful decision: Continue with his campaign against all reasonable odds, or suspend. Deciding to suspend his campaign, John Edwards said, "It's time for me to step aside so that history can blaze its path."
Thus, the progressive wing of the Democratic Party was able to unite before Super Tuesday. Edwards' supporters broke for Obama at least 3 to 1, and the Edwards voter pool was the final nail in Clinton's loss to Barack Obama.
Bill & South Carolina: While I personally wonder if Bill Clinton meant anything derogatory with his "Jesse Jackson" moment, it is clear that Bill's comments galvanized the black vote for Obama throughout the remainder of the primary campaign.
While "Jesse Jackson" didn't lose the campaign for Hillary Clinton, it sure didn't help any either.
The February Plummet: So there we were -- February. The month Clinton lost the Democratic nomination for President. Wisconsin was the final victory for Obama, not Montana, truth be told. Everything after Wisconsin was purely cosmetic.
The strategy of Mark Penn, and its utter incompetence, was made clear in February. As well as the failure of Hillary Clinton's campaign for the Democratic nomination for President.
Also, somebody in the Clinton campaign (one would assume, Patti Solis Doyle) allowed all the money to be spent in and before January. Not only did Clinton fail to have a strategy after Super Tuesday, she was broke as well. Not conducive to running a winning campaign.
Clinton backers can blame the media, sexism, and the pundits all they want for Clinton's failure, but ultimately blame can be summarized in two words: Mark Penn. Well, maybe you better add the acronym "AUMF" to the failure as well. Failure to plan beyond Super Tuesday was a death knell.
Sniper Fire: "Sniper Fire" ended any ability Clinton may have had to change minds outside of her base set of voters. "Sniper Fire" is, frankly, utter ignominy that Clinton may never live down -- another ironic fruit of Clinton's overzealousness in pursuit of her negative "kitchen sink" strategy.
Beyond being disingenuous, "Sniper Fire" set in stone the meme that Clinton would do or say anything to win. While not affecting Clinton's core base, "Sniper Fire" limited any expansion of her core base.
And Clinton's "Commander-in-Chief from Day One" argument (Clinton and John McCain being "ready," but not Obama) simply could not have helped her quest for Democratic superdelegates.
"Sniper Fire" has Mark Penn's fingerprints all over it.
Final Defiance: After the Montana and South Dakota vote, Clinton gave a speech with expressions of pure fantasy, arrogance, and defiance. While the speech had nothing to do with Clinton's loss in her primary run of 2008 -- she lost the nomination in the snows of Wisconsin -- it may well deleteriously affect her chances for the nomination in 2012 or 2016.
Many Democratic activists are simply not going to forget her failure to figure out how to act once one loses the nomination. One doesn't seemingly bargain for the Vice-Presidency, and one doesn't suggest that a person of a particular gender should, or should not be, on the Democratic nominee's VP list. And so, 2008 may affect Hillary Clinton's Presidential aspirations long after 2008.
Rehabilitation?: Nonetheless, Hillary Clinton does have two future advantages. One is the healing power of time. Second is the instinctive desire among Democrats to forgive.
I fully expect that Hillary Clinton will get behind the Democratic Party as it sets forth to take the country back from extreme Republican misgovernance. Life is long and thus, Hillary Clinton's best days may well lay ahead of her.
Your thoughts?
